Trawling for the truth
16.04.2007
An inquest on Thursday Island will try to discover why the Immigration Department allowed the skipper of an unseaworthy boat to make a perilous and tragic voyage, writes Tony Koch
ALTHOUGH they occupy dozens of islands, the people who live in the Torres Strait are a united family in times of trauma, and nothing unites them so much as the death of one of their own.
That is why the coronial inquest that opens today on Thursday Island into the October 2005 sinking of the Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs vessel Malu Sara, with the loss of four Islander adults and a four-year-old child, will be observed with such keen interest.
And anger.
The senior DIMIA official on Thursday Island, Garry Chaston, had to leave the island and move to Cairns soon after the incident because of fears his life was in danger.
Islanders want to know -- and no doubt Queensland state coroner Michael Barnes will also want to find out -- why Chaston, a former Australian Federal Police officer, left a junior officer to monitor by telephone the Malu Sara when it was in trouble on the evening of October 14, 2005, while he kept an appointment to accompany his wife to dinner at the Thursday Island Lawn Bowls Club.
Chaston will be the key witness. It was he who ordered six 6.5m centre-console aluminium boats on the department's behalf from a Cairns supplier, and he was the one charged with ensuring the vessels were properly and safely outfitted, and that their operators were trained in their competent and safe operation.
Chaston will be asked why he ordered DIMIA officer Wilfred Baira to steer the Malu Sara the 74km from Saibai Island to Badu Island when he was aware on the morning of October 14 that the Malu Sara was taking water and Baira was concerned about its seaworthiness.
Section 330 of the Queensland Criminal Code provides a penalty up to 14 years' imprisonment for a person found guilty of ``sending a ship to sea in such an unseaworthy state that the life of any person is likely to be thereby endangered''.
The Malu Sara and its five sister boats had been commissioned only a month earlier at a gala ceremony on Thursday Island attended by then immigration minister Amanda Vanstone. However, as Australian Transport Safety Bureau investigators discovered after the Malu Sara sank, none of the vessels was properly safety-checked during construction by Subsee Explorer Pty Ltd in Cairns.
They were so badly built that it was discovered the back scuppers through which water on the deck has to drain out to sea were below water level. The welding on the boats was so poor that they were not watertight, and there was inadequate flotation built into the hulls to ensure that the vessels would remain afloat in case they capsized.
But the most serious issue -- and one that has to be cleared up by Chaston -- is the fact that the vessels had virtually no safety equipment or even the most basic navigation equipment. The Malu Sara had a compass but did not have a navigation chart, a radio, a global positioning system or a depth sounder. And the only bilge pump was hand-operated.
As well, the emergency position-indicating radio beacon provided by DIMIA was the outmoded analog type that responded only to low-orbiting satellites every one to two hours. It cost $200, compared with $500 for a later model that gives instant and constant positioning. The $200 EPIRB was accurate to about 13km while the later version is accurate to within metres.
DIMIA had procured the six vessels as part of the federal Government's strategy to control illegal immigrants and fishermen and to give an early warning in the strategically important Torres Strait region if suspicious vessels or terrorist activity were suspected or encountered.
The patrols were intended to be in concert with another failed part of the strategy: the installation of a $20 million radar system on Pumpkin Island near Badu Island.
When launching this particular aspect of the anti-insurgent policy in 2004, then defence minister Robert Hill and Customs minister Chris Ellison said the radar trial ``delivered on the Government's 2001 border protection election commitment''.
``This trial shows that the Australian Government is committed to using the latest technology to protect our country from drugs, disease, illegal immigration and fishing, and other threats,'' they said.
``The trial of the surface-wave extended coastal area radar system begins in August and will provide 24-hour, wide-area surveillance of aircraft, ships and boats travelling in the Torres Strait.
``It will also increase the capacity of Defence and Coastwatch to detect and intercept immigration, quarantine and fisheries offenders, assist with search and rescue operations, and provide early storm warnings.''
This $20 million see-all radar system was not far from the spot where the Malu Sara sank in the early hours of October 15, 2005, and defence authorities refuse to confirm whether it was activated when the vessel was in trouble.
Indications are that it almost certainly was not operating. Last month Defence Minister Brendan Nelson announced that the facility would close because it was not able to detect the types of boats typically used by poachers and people-smugglers.
The Malu Sara's skipper Baira did not have a licence to operate a motor boat. He was unfamiliar with the Malu Sara's twin engines, as he had not be trained on this kind of vessel.
His only means of communication, a satellite telephone, was also new to him.
The Malu sara's crew consisted of Baira and a fellow DIMIA officer, Ted Harry. Also on board on October 14 were Valorie Faub and Flora Enosa, the latter with her young daughter Ethena.
The five left Saibai after lunch for the 74km open-sea trip, but soon encountered fog and rain, with Baira reporting back to Chaston on Thursday Island that he was lost. The situation remained unchanged until 2.15am, by when more than 80 telephone calls had been made between the boat, DIMIA officials and police on Thursday Island.
It was then that Baira said the Malu Sara was ``sinking fast''. There was no further communication with the vessel.
Families and friends of the five who drowned when the Malu Sara went down will expect Barnes to investigate why it took until after 7am for a search vessel to reach the spot where the sinking boat had last been reported. By then the only trace that remained was the useless EPIRB floating in the water.
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau investigation into the sinking of the vessel was completed late last year, and Island leaders are incensed at the report's findings that nobody appears to be responsible for any aspect of the tragedy.
The investigators accepted apparently untested evidence that Chaston was telephoned by Baira before he left on the fateful voyage and told that he thought the 74km trip was too dangerous and that the Malu Sara should instead be returned to Badu on a barge. The investigators also did not attach any blame to police who maintained radio contact throughout the night with Baira, although it is acknowledged that there was basic ignorance of rescue procedures.
Their report says in part: ``From 0133 to 0200, the mission co-ordinator made 17 attempts to contact Malu Sara but apparently without success, although a conversation of nearly 26 seconds was recorded at 0145.
``At this stage it would have been reasonable to initiate an active SAR [search and rescue] operation with the limited resources available.''
So the investigators considered it was reasonable to begin emergency procedures at 1.45am on October 15. The vessel sank 30 minutes later, yet the search was not activated until 7am, and Chaston did not come to the office to take control until after 9am.
As well, the report blames Baira for, among other things, deciding to leave Saibai in the prevailing conditions despite his concerns about the seaworthiness of the Malu Sara.
The report blames Baira for:
* Not carrying a navigation chart.
* Deciding to take three additional passengers without approval.
* Inadequate communication with the Thursday Island duty officer in accordance with the operating procedures.
* The decision not to indicate distress until the vessel was taking water.
* His insufficient knowledge of the operation of the satellite telephone and the vessel's outboard motor lubricating oil system.
Islanders see those findings as a cop-out and an attempt to deflect blame from government officials to the indigenous operator because he can no longer answer for himself.
They have a strong case in arguing that Baira had no training on the operation of the vessel. Furthermore, he did not have a licence and had been expected to navigate without a chart. Islanders also argue that Baira did not have knowledge of operating procedures or know when and how to declare an emergency. He also did not know how to operate the motors or the telephone.
The Islanders know it is nonsense to suggest Baira should be blamed for this tragedy. It was clearly responsibility of others to ensure, at the very least, that he was trained in the use of the boat, and that the vessel was seaworthy and properly outfitted before it was sent on the 74km voyage across open seas.
October 14, 2005
Immigration Department vessel Malu Sara leaves Saibai and runs into trouble
October 15, 2005
The Malu Sara sinks; four Islander adults and a four-year-old child are lost
