Officials blamed for search delay
21.04.2007
The five who died in the Torres Strait on the patrol boat Malu Sara might have been saved by prompt action, Tony Koch reports
SERIOUS negligence by federal officials and subsequent inept handling by Queensland Police cost the lives of five people when the Immigration Department vessel Malu Sara sank in the Torres Strait in October 2005.
An expert report tendered to a coronial inquest being held on Thursday Island concludes that the failure by Immigration officers to alert police earlier ``prevented the situation being resolved within hours''.
It states that the Malu Sara skipper had reported being ``lost'' about 4pm on October 14, 2005, but Immigration officials did not alert police until 7.15pm. Had police been advised earlier, ``they may have been able to resolve the situation in daylight or not long after dark''.
Despite the three-hour delay in raising the alarm, the report concludes that the five people on board the patrol boat might still have been rescued had police followed correct procedures.
Queensland Coroner Michael Barnes, who is heading the hearing into the loss of the Malu Sara, commissioned a review of the search and rescue operation launched after the vessel sank off Badu Island.
The 23-page review was completed by Australia's foremost search and rescue expert, Anthony Marshall, a senior instructor and director of the National Search and Rescue School.
His report contradicts the findings of an early inquiry by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau, which blamed skipper Wilfred Baira for the deaths, saying he was suffering from fatigue and that his judgment therefore might have been impaired.
The Malu Sara, a 6.5m aluminium vessel powered by two 90hp outboard motors, was one of six boats to be used by Immigration officials based on islands dotted throughout the Torres Strait as part of the federal Government's border protection policy.
The boats were delivered in 2005 to the various islands by barge but most were kept out of the water until the skippers -- Immigration employees known as movement monitoring officers -- had completed a week-long workshop on Saibai Island, where they were to learn how to handle the craft and how to use satellite telephones.
But the inquest has heard that danger signs were evident even before the workshop began. The Malu Sara, skippered by Baira, experienced engine trouble and began taking on water during the 74km voyage from Badu to Saibai. Once at Saibai, it continued taking on serious volumes of water while at anchor.
At the conclusion of the training sessions and as the weather closed in, an uneasy Baira asked his superior, Garry Chaston, if he could stay an extra night rather than cross back to Badu in rough seas.
The request was denied by Mr Chaston who, according to evidence presented to the inquest by MMO Patricia Mooka, told Baira the Immigration Department could not afford to pay for his accommodation costs.
Baira, who did not have a licence to drive a boat, left Saibai at 12.30pm on October 14, taking with him four passengers -- Ted Harry, Valerie Faub, Flora Enosa and her four-year-old daughter Ethena. Three-and-a-half hours later, Baira used a satellite phone to tell Mr Chaston, who had flown back to Thursday Island by helicopter, that he was lost in thick fog.
Yet despite the earlier indications that the boat was not seaworthy, Mr Chaston left his office at 7pm to take his wife for dinner at the Thursday Island lawn bowls club, handing responsibility for the situation to a junior officer, Jerry Stephen.
Mr Stephen almost immediately contacted police, who took control of the operation at 7.15pm.
In the hours that followed, more than 80 sat-phone calls were made from the Malu Sara to police at the Immigration office. During the last, at 2.15am on October 15, Baira said they were ``taking water and sinking fast''. It was only then that a decision was made to dispatch a rescue vessel.
The Malu Sara was never found. Mr Marshall's review of the search and rescue operation is damning.
``At 1554, advice was received the vessel was unsure of its position,'' he wrote. ``Had the QPS (Queensland Police Service) been advised earlier ... the outcome of the incident could have been far more successful.
``There is no record of what intelligence information DIMIA passed to the QPS at 1915. This could have been vital to the QPS assessment and response to the incident.''
Mr Marshall wrote that the police quickly advised Australian Search and Rescue in Canberra and contact between Thursday Island and AusSAR continued throughout the night.
Mr Stephen remained at the Immigration office and kept a log of how events unfolded. Key aspects of his report suggest a communications breakdown.
``The DIMIA log at 0225 states `taking in water fast, sinking' and yet the QPS conversations with AusSAR states `taking in a bit of water and bailing out', the Marshall report says.
``The assumption at this time should have been that the persons are in thewater and require immediate assistance.
``The QPS response was to task the VMR (volunteer marine rescue) vessel from Badu Island, which departed at 0415 and arrived on the scene at about 0645 on October 15. This is four hours and 20 minutes from the time the vessel was reported to be sinking.
``Subsequently, the VMR vessel could not locate the Malu Sara ... and aviation assistance was requested at 0847, some 6 1/2 hours after the sinking time.''
In his conclusions, Mr Marshall says the initial search ``is best described as too little, too late''.
